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MATERIALITY OF MISREPRESENTATIONS MADE ON VISA APPLICATIONS IN
LIGHT OF CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL POLICY
Approximately 500,000 immigrants' legally enter the United States
each year. 2 The number of undocumented aliens in the United States is
estimated to be between 3.5-6 million. 3 In order to be lawfully admitted
to the United States, each entering alien 4 must possess a valid unexpired
immigrant visa. 5 In order to obtain a valid visa, the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of 1952 (INA) 6 provides that an alien must, under
oath, provide all information necessary to determine whether he or she
is eligible to enter the United States. 7 Once in the United States, a resi-
1. See 2 C. GORDON & E. GORDON, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW
§ 2.4a (1985). An immigrant is a person who enters the United States desiring
to become a permanent resident. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(15) (1982) (defin-
ing "immigrant").
2. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 86 (1986). For instance, the U.S. Government reports that
449,330 immigrants legally entered the United States in 1980, and 543,903 en-
tered in 1984. Id. Persons desiring to enter the United States are presumptively
categorized as aliens until able to prove otherwise. See 1 C. GORDON & H. Ro-
SENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.3A (1983).
3. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'TJUSTICE, INS RE-
PORTER, 1 (1983). The Senate Committee on the Judiciary noted that the Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy made this determination in
1978 and the current figure is probably much higher. SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 99TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CON-
TROL ACT of 1985, 5 (Comm. Print 1985), [hereinafter cited as COMMIrrEE
REPORT].
4. See 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(3) (1982) (defining "alien"). The Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) defines an alien as "any person not a citizen
or national of the United States." Id.
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (1982). Section 1181 provides in pertinent part: "Ex-
cept as provided in subsection (b) and subsection (c) of this section no immi-
grant shall be admitted into the United States unless at the time of application
for admission he (1) has valid unexpired immigrant visa .... " Id.
6. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walters), Pub. L.
No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1982)).
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (1982). The section entitled Applications for Visa
provides in pertinent part:
Every alien applying for an immigrant visa and for alien registra-
tion shall make application therefor in such form and manner and at
such place as shall be by regulations prescribed. In the application the
immigrant shall state his full and true name ... age and sex; the date
and places of his birth; present address and place of previous residence
... calling or occupation; personal description.., whether he was ever
arrested [or] convicted .. .and such additional information necessary
to the identification of the applicant and the enforcement of the immi-
gration and nationality laws as may be by regulations prescribed.
Id. § 1202(a).
Section 1202(e) further provides that "each copy of an application required
(1046)
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dent alien may remain indefinitely "unless the government determines
that he is engaging in or has engaged in activities which would render
him deportable under the provisions of the INA.' ' 8 A lawfully admitted
alien who remains within the country for five continuous years9 and
meets all other statutory requirements' ° is eligible to become a natural-
by this section shall be signed by the applicant in the presence of the consular
officer, and verified by the oath of the applicant administered by the consular
officer." Id. § 1202(e).
Regarding burden of proof, the INA provides that the burden of demon-
strating eligibility to enter the United States:
[w]henever any person makes application for a visa or any other
document required for entry, or makes application for admission, or
otherwise attempts to enter the United States, the burden of proof shall
be upon such person to establish that he is eligible to receive such visa
or such document .... If such person fails to establish to the satisfac-
tion of the consular officer that he is eligible to receive a visa or other
document required for entry, no visa or other document required for
entry shall be issued to such person, nor shall such person be admitted
to the United States unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the At-
torney General that he is not subject to exclusion under any provision
of this chapter.
8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982).
The INA further provides that the alien will not receive a visa if:
(1) it appears to the consular officer, from statements in the applica-
tion, or in the papers submitted therewith, that such alien is ineligible
to receive a visa . . . or
(2) the consular officer knows or has reason to believe that such alien
is ineligible to receive a visa ... under section 1182 of this title or any
other provision of law ....
8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1982).
Even if an alien is otherwise eligible for a visa, the final actual award is based
on a complex system of preferences and quotas. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153
(1982).
8. C. GORDON & E. GORDON, supra note 1, § 2.45. The Deportable Aliens
provision of the INA lists a number of reasons for which an alien may be de-
ported. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982).
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1982). Section 1427 provides in pertinent part:
[nlo person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall
be naturalized unless such petitioner, (1) immediately preceding the
date filing his petition for naturalization has resided continuously, after
being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United
States for at least five years and during the five years immediately pre-
ceding the date of filing his petition has been physically present therein
for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided
within the State in which the petitioner filed the petition for at least six
months, (2) has resided continuously within the United States from the
date of the petition up to the time of admission to citizenship, and
(3) during all the period referred to in this subsection has been and still
is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order
and happiness of the United States.
Id. § 1427(a).
10. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982).
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ized citizen I I of the United States. 1 2
Once granted citizenship, the former alien receives all rights and
privileges enjoyed by native-born American citizens.' 3 However, a natu-
ralized citizen may have United States citizenship revoked if the govern-
ment can prove that it was "illegally procured or . . .procured by
concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation .... ,,14 In
Chaunt v. United States,' 5 the United States Supreme Court developed a
two-prong test to be applied in determining the materiality of a misrep-
11. See id. § 1101(a)(23). "The term 'naturalization' means the conferring
of nationality of a state upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever." Id.
12. In order to become a naturalized citizen, the alien must file a sworn
petition including "all facts which in the opinion of the Attorney General may be
material to the applicant's naturalization." 8 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1982). The INA
provides that all petitions for naturalization shall be investigated at the discre-
tion of the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1982). The Attorney Gen-
eral's Office then makes a recommendation on the petition to the appropriate
naturalization court. Id. § 1446(b). A naturalization court is a court authorized
under the INA to exercise naturalization jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (24)
(1982). Section 1421 of the INA indicates the specific courts authorized to exer-
cise naturalization jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (1982). The investigator of a
petition may subpoena the testimony of any witness, including the applicant, and
also take testimony concerning matters which may have a bearing on the appli-
cant's eligibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (1982). The burden of proof is on the alien
to show that he or she was lawfully admitted into the United States. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1429 (1982).
An Alien who is declared admissible to citizenship by a naturalization court
is entitled to receive a certificate of naturalization which orders that the alien be
admitted as a citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1449 (1982). The court's
order is the official grant of citizenship, which becomes effective once the appli-
cant has taken the oath of allegiance. See C. GORDON & E. GORDON, supra note 1,
at §§ 16.8, 16.9; 8 C.F.R. § 337.2 (1985) ("Any person who was or shall hereaf-
ter be admitted to citizenship by the written order of a naturalization court, shall
be deemed to be a citizen of the United States as of the date of taking the pre-
scribed oath of allegiance.").
13. See C. GORDON & E. GORDON, supra note 1, § 16.12. The only exception
is that under the United States Constitution only natural born Americans are
eligible to become President of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982). Section 1451(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for the respective
districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute pro-
ceedings in any court specified in subsection (a) of section 1421 of this
title ... for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admit-
ting such person to citizenship and cancelling the certificate of naturali-
zation on the ground that such order and certificate of naturalization
were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a material
fact or by willful misrepresentation....
Id. It should be noted that "[n]otwithstanding the precise language of [this sec-
tion], the government must demonstrate both willfulness and materiality with
respect to any misrepresentation or concealment." United States v. Kungys, 793
F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 507-08
n.28 (1981); United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 1985) (en
banc), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1188 (1986)).
15. 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
1048
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resentation or concealment made in a petition for naturalization.16 If a
court applying the Chaunt test determines that a naturalized citizen mis-
represented a material fact on his Petition for Naturalization, that citi-
zen's certificate of citizenship will be revoked and the citizen will be
denaturalized. 17
The effect of denaturalization is to restore the naturalized citizen to
alien status.' 8 Nevertheless, the alien is allowed to remain in the United
States unless the government can show that he or she is deportable
under the INA. 19 Fraudulently procuring an immigration visa through
material misrepresentation is sufficient ground for deportation. 20 While
the Supreme Court has not yet established a definitive test for determin-
ing the materiality of a misrepresentation in a visa application, 2' all of
16. For a discussion of the Chaunt test, see infra notes 56-57 and accompa-
nying text.
17. United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488, 494 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1188 (1986). The Supreme Court has held that "failure to
comply with [all the congressionally implied prerequisites to the acquisition of
citizenship] renders [the] certificate of citizenship revocable as 'illegally pro-
cured', " and naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be set aside.
Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 514-15 (1981) (interpreting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1451(a)).
18. See C. GORDON & E. GORDON, supra note 1, § 20.5. The status of a
denaturalized alien is the same as that of an alien who entered the country under
a valid immigrant visa. Id. For a discussion of the requirements for immigrating
to the United States, see supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
19. C. GORDON & E. GORDON, supra note 1, § 20.5 (citing Costello v. INS,
376 U.S. 120 (1964)). An alien may be deportable under the INA for a number
of reasons, including inter alia, that he or she was excludable at the time of
entry. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982). An alien is excludable at time of entry if
that alien "seeks to procure, or has sought to procure, or has procured a visa or
other documents by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact." 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1982).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1982). Under § 1251, any alien who procured a
visa by fraud within the meaning of § 1182(a)(19) is deportable. Id. Section
1182(a)(19) further provides that any alien "who seeks to procure, or has sought
to procure, or has procured a visa ... by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a
material fact" is ineligible to receive a visa and shall be excluded from entering
the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1982). In order to find that an alien
is not eligible to obtain a visa under section 1182(a)(19), it must be determined
that:
(a) there has been a misrepresentation made by the applicant,
(b) the misrepresentation was willfully made, and
(c) the fact misrepresented is material.
2 Federal Immigration L. Rep. (CCH) 11,099 § 4291(a)(19), 4-43 (1983).
A misrepresentation "is an assertion or manifestation not in accordance
with the facts." Id. For a misrepresentation to fall within § 1182(a)(19), it must
have been made to an official of the United States Government. Id. The term
"willfully" as used under § 1182(a)(19) means knowingly and intentionally. Id.
Thus, the alien must have been "fully aware of the nature of the information
sought and knowingly, intentionally, and deliberately made an untrue state-
ment." Id.
21. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981) (addressing by fail-
ure to establish definitive materiality standard); Case Comment, Dena traliza-
1986] 1049
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss3/8
1050 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31: p. 1046
the circuit courts of appeals addressing this issue have applied the
Chaunt test to make such a determination.2 2 Those circuits remain di-
vided only as to the proper interpretation of the second prong of the
Chaunt test. 23 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has suggested, 24 and
many commentators have agreed, 25 that the Chaunt test may, in fact not
be applicable to misrepresentations made on visa applications. In light
of the apparent conflict in authority, this note will first address the issue
of whether the Chaunt test may properly be applied to determine the
materiality of a misrepresentation made on a visa application. 26 Assum-
ing, arguendo, that the Chaunt test is applicable, the second issue this
note will address is the appropriate interpretation of the Chaunt test. 27
II. EVOLUTION OF THE MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION PROVISIONS
A. Deportation
Prior to the Second World War, federal court decisions had sug-
gested that an alien who made a material misrepresentation in order to
obtain an immigrant visa was subject to deportation for illegally entering
tion-Material Misrepresentation Under Displaced Person Act of 1948, 6 SUFFOLK
TRANSNT'L LJ. 163, 182 (1982) (concluding Fedorenko Court should have clari-
fied Chaunt test of materiality).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985) (en
banc) (applying the first prong of the Chaunt test to determine materiality of
misrepresentations made at the visa application stage), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1188 (1986); Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying both
prongs of Chaunt test), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2915 (1986); United States v.
Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1979), aff 'don other grounds, 449 U.S. 490
(1981) (same); Kassab v. INS, 364 F.2d 806, 807 (6th Cir. 1966) (same); United
States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962) (same); Langhammer v. Hamilton,
295 F.2d 642, 648 (1st Cir. 1961) (same); see also United States v. Palciauskas,
734 F.2d 625, 628 (11 th Cir. 1984) (applying test similar to that used in Chaunt).
23. For a discussion of the split of authority among the circuits, see infra
note 57 and accompanying text.
24. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981) (Chaunt test may
not be applicable to misrepresentations made on visa applications). For a dis-
cussion of the facts of Fedorenko, see infra note 58.
25. Note, Denaturalization of Nazi- War Criminals after Fedorenko, 15 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 169 (1983) (Chaunt should not apply where misrepresentation is
made on visa applications) [hereinater cited as Note, Denaturalization]. But see,
Appleman, Misrepresentation in Immigration Law: Materiality, 22 FED. B.J. 267
(1962) (Chaunt applies to determine materiality of misrepresentation "must be
an application for naturalization and it recognized that a similar misrepresenta-
tion to a consul in connection with an application for a visa could be held mate-
rial"); Case Comment, supra note 21, at 182 (criticizing Supreme Court for not
applying Chaunt in Fedorenko). For a commentator's opposing views, see Note,
Misrepresentation and Materiality in Immigration Law-Scouring the Melting Pot, 48
FORDHAM L. REV. 471 (1980) (assumes Chaunt applies) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Misrepresentation and Materiality].
26. For a discussion of whether Chaunt applies to misrepresentations made
on visa applications, see infra notes 110-123 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of the proper interpretation of the second prong of the
Chaunt test, see infra notes 89-109 and accompanying text.
5
Bachrach: Materiality of Misrepresentations Made on Visa Applications in Li
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
1986] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW 1051
the United States. 28 Congress codified this view as part of the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948 (DPA). 29 The DPA was enacted to authorize, for a
limited period of time, the admission into the United States of certain
Europeans displaced by the war for permanent residence and other pur-
poses.30 However, the DPA provided that "any person who shall will-
fully make a misrepresentation for the purpose of gaining admission
into the United States as an eligible displaced person shall thereafter not
be admissible into the United States."'' t Although not eligible to enter
28. Note, Misrepresentation and Materiality, supra note 25, at 487 (citing
United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 62 F.2d 808 (7th Cir.), aff'd, 289 U.S. 472
(1933) (applicant who falsifies a statement in order to gain admission to the
United States is deportable where the falsification would have led to an investi-
gation to determine applicant's eligibility)); see also United States ex rel. Fink v.
Riemer, 96 F.2d 217 (2d Cir.) (while it is true that statute does not expressly
exclude those who get their papers by fraud, fraud thwarts statute's very pur-
pose), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 618 (1938); C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRA-
TION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 47.c (1978).
29. Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA), Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 10, 62 Stat.
1009, 1013 (1948).
30. Id. The displaced persons problem in Europe coincided with the end of
hostilities between Germany and the Allies. S. REP. No. 950, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8, reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 2028, 2035. In 1946, approxi-
mately 1,300,000 displaced persons remained in the United States, British and
French Zones of Germany, Austria and Italy as a result of losing their homes
during the war. Id. at 2037. In order to bring about a rapid solution to this
problem, the United Nations established the International Refugee Organiza-
tion (IRO). See IRO Constitution, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1946 62 Stat.
3037, T.I.A.S. No. 1846 (entered into force Aug. 20, 1948). The objective of the
IRO was to return persons to their native country if possible or resettle them in
countries willing to accept them. Id. Those of concern to the IRO, generally,
included displaced persons and refugees "who are or who may hereafter be out
of their country of nationality or former residence and who are unwilling to re-
turn because of fear of persecution, or persons who fled from Germany or Aus-
tria because of Nazi persecution and have returned but have not been resettled."
S. REP. No. 950, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG.
SERV. 2028, 2037. Persons not protected by the IRO included: "(1) War
criminals and (2) Any other person who can be shown to have a) assisted the
enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries . . . , or b) voluntarily as-
sisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the second world war in their oper-
ation against the United States." 62 Stat. §§ 3051-52 (1948).
The DPA allowed persons of concern to the IRO to be brought into the
United States over and above normal quota limitations. Under the DPA, the
number of immigration visas to be issued to eligible displaced persons was lim-
ited to 202,000. See Note, Misrepresentation and Materiality, supra note 25, at 472
n. 11. Quota limitations were not totally disregarded; any immigrants allowed
into the United States in excess of the annual quota "would be subtracted up to
50%, from the annual quotas in succeeding years." Id. (citing Act ofJune 25,
1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 3(b), 62 Stat. 1009, 1010 (1948)). In the three and
one-half years immediately following its enactment, some 400,000 persons of
concern to the DPA entered the United States. See Note, Denaturalization, supra
note 25, at 193 n.31 (citing 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION AND
PROCEDURE § 1.2d (rev. ed. 1982)).
31. DPA § 10, 62 Stat. at 1013 (1948). Any person attempting to enter the
United States under the DPA had the burden of proof in establishing 1) that he
6
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the United States under the DPA, several alleged Nazi war criminals en-
tered in violation of this provision by failing to provide truthful accounts
of their activities during the war.32 Such persons were excludable on the
grounds that they misrepresented or concealed material facts concern-
ing their alleged involvement in atrocities, since full disclosure of these
facts would have precluded them from entering the United States. 33
This provision remained unchanged by the Congressional Act of 195034
which otherwise substantially amended the DPA and extended its effec-
tive date untilJuly 1, 1952. 3 5 Subsequently, Congress adopted a similar
provision as part of the present Immigration and Nationality Act, en-
acted in 1952.36 Under the current act, any alien who misrepresents or
conceals a material fact on his visa application is thereafter excluded
from entering the United States, 3 7 and thus subject to deportation. 38
or she was a displaced person of concern to the IRO and 2) that he or she was
eligible to enter the United States. Id.
32. See Note, Misrepresentation and Materiality, supra note 25, at 473 (citing
123 CONG. REC. 3159 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Holtzman)).
33. H.R. REP. No. 1452, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 4700, 4703; see also United States v. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. 490
(1981). Under the Fedorenko Court's interpretation of the DPA, in order to
render an alien excludable, the misrepresentation must have concerned a mate-
rial fact. Id. at 597. Initially the Court acknowledged that the DPA provision
does not on its face require a showing of materiality. Id. at 507-08 n.28. How-
ever, after drawing a comparison between the DPA and the denaturalization stat-
ute contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Court reasoned
that a materiality requirement may be read into the DPA provision. Id. The INA
statute cited by the Court provides that the naturalized citizenship may be re-
voked "on the ground that such order and certificate of naturalization were pro-
cured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." 8
U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982). Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, further sup-
ported his position by noting that the Court had previously interpreted the pro-
vision to require that the willful misrepresentation be related to a material fact.
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 507; Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
34. Pub. L. No. 555, 64 Stat. 219, 226 (1950).
35. Id. Among other changes, the 1950 Act redefined who was an "eligible
displaced person." Pub. L. No. 555, § 2 c, d, 64 Stat. 219 (1950). In addition,
the Act added two sections to deal with special non-quota immigrants such as
orphans. Id. at 220. Congress also added a section dealing with appropriation
of funds to finance "the reception and transportation of eligible displaced per-
sons." Id. at 228.
36. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walters), Pub. L.
No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1982)). The pur-
pose of the INA was "to enact a comprehensive, revised immigration, naturaliza-
tion, and nationality code." H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82 Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted
in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653.
37. Id. The INA provides: "[a]ny alien who seeks to procure, or has sought
to procure, or has procured a visa or other documentation, or seeks to enter the
United States, by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact" is ineligi-
ble to receive a visa and is excludable from admission to the United States. 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1982).
This provision of the INA differs from the DPA provision in that Congress
required exclusion under the INA only if the misrepresentation was material.
The House Reports show that Congress amended the immigration law to re-
1052
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B. Denaturalization
During the early 1900's, there was a mass influx of immigrants into
the United States.3 9 Along with these immigrants came widespread
abuse of the naturalization process. 40 Prior to 1906, no statute allowed
the government to revoke a certificate of naturalization which had been
"improperly procured."'4 1 In the Nationality Act of 1906,42 Congress
provided that a naturalized citizen may have his citizenship revoked on
two grounds: (a) fraud and (b) illegality relating to the procurement of
the naturalization certificate. 4 3 This provision was retained, without
substantial change, in the Nationality Act of 1940. 44 Then, in a 1950
report, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary rec-
ommended that the grounds for revocation be changed from "fraud" to
"concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation. ' 45 Es-
quire showing of materiality because under the DPA, European Immigrants
seeking to gain admission who had "fear of repatriation under duress or com-
pulsion," occasionally misrepresented their birthplace or other personal data
not material to their admissibility. See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82 Cong., 2d Sess. 5,
reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1704. Where such misrep-
resentations did not have any effect on "the material issues involved," House
members reasoned, it should not serve as a basis for exclusion. Id.
According to the State Department Foreign Affairs Manual, an alien who
seeks to procure ... or has procured a visa or documentation by means of fraud
or willful misrepresentation is permanently ineligible to receive a visa at any
time. 2 Federal Immigration L. Rep. (CCH) 11,099 § 42.91(a)(19), 4-43
(1983). Whereas, an alien who seeks to enter the United States through fraud or
willful misrepresentation is ineligible only at the time of entry. Id.
38. Under § 5125(a) "an alien who is determined to be excludable at the
time of entry is subject to deportation under the Immigration and Nationality
Act." 8 U.S.C. § 5125(a)(1) (1982); see also C. GORDON & E. GORDON, supra note
1, § 84.79.
39. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 53, 75 (1950).
40. See Note, Misrepresentation and Materiality, supra note 25, at 483. The
commentator suggests that the immigration legislation of the early 1900's was
an exercise of Congress' constitutional power "[t]o establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization" in response to perceived abuses. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 58, cl. 4).
41. 3 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 2, § 20.26.
42. Act ofJune 29, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338 § 18, 34 Stat. 596, 601 (1906).
43. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 54 (1950). Section 15 of the
Act of 1906 provided in part:
It shall be the duty of the United States district attorneys . . . upon
affidavit showing good cause therefore, to institute proceedings ... for
the purpose of setting aside and cancelling the certificate of citizenship
on the ground of fraud or the ground that such certificate of citizenship
was illegally procured.
34 Stat. 601 (1906).
44. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat.
1137; see S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 755.
45. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 769. The Subcommittee rec-
ognized that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) already consid-
ered "fraud" to involve misrepresentations or concealment of material facts
made during naturalization proceedings. Id. at 755. The INS interpretation was
1986] 1053
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sentially the same standard is used for excluding or deporting an alien
who fraudulently obtained a visa.4 6 Congress adopted the change in
language when it enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952.4 7 Substantially the same provision is currently in effect.4 8
III. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT OF THE MATERIAL
MISREPRESENTATION PROVISION
A. Denaturalization
The first denaturalization action under the Act of 190649 was
brought to cancel the certificate of citizenship of one Johannessen, on
the ground that the certificate "had been fraudulently and illegally pro-
cured."' 50 The Supreme Court, inJohannessen v. United States,5 1 did not
discuss the issue of materiality in holding that "[an] alien has no moral
nor constitutional right to retain the privileges of citizenship, if by false
evidence or the like, an imposition has been practiced upon the court
without which the certificate of citizenship could not and would not have
been issued." 5 2
preferred because of the confusion among practitioners as to whether "fraud"
included both "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" fraud. Id. at 756.
The Subcommittee felt that the phrase "willful misrepresentation or con-
cealment of a material fact" would clear up conflicts and, at the same time, make
it easier for the government to prove its case. Id. at 769; see Note, Misrepresenta-
tion and Materiality, supra note 25, at 484 nn.109-15.
46. For a discussion of the history of the basis for excluding or deporting
an alien for misrepresentation relating to the visa application, see supra notes 28-
38 and accompanying text.
47. 66 Stat. 163, 260, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 166.
48. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982). The current provision provides in perti-
nent part: "[i]t shall be the duty of the United States attorneys... upon affidavit
showing good cause therefor, to institute proceedings . . . for the purpose of
revoking and setting aside the order admitting such person to citizenship and
cancelling the certificate of naturalization on the ground that such order and
certificate of naturalization were illegally procured or were procured by conceal-
ment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation .... " Id. The 1952 Act
did not include illegal procurement as a ground for denaturalization. 3 C.
GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 2, at §§ 20.4c to 20.4d. In 1961, Congress
amended the INA to include illegal procurement as a ground for denaturaliza-
tion. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), as amendedby Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No.
87-301, § 18, 75 Stat. 656.
49. Act of June 29, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 15, 34 Stat. 596, 601.
50. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 232 (1912). Johannessen,
a native of Norway, arrived in the United States in December of 1888. Id. at 232.
In October 1892, he applied for and procured a certificate of citizenship. Id. at
232-33. He obtained the certificate through the perjured testimony of two wit-
nesses who testified that Johannessen had resided in the United States for at
least five years. Id. at 233. The government brought an action under the Act of
1906 alleging that Johannessen had obtained his citizenship by fraudulent
means. Id.
51. 225 U.S. 227 (1912).
52. Id. at 241. See generally Note, Misrepresentation and Materiality, supra note
25, at 484-85 (discussingJohannessen and other early denaturalization cases).
1054 [Vol. 31: p. 1046
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In later actions, the courts' decisions tended to emphasize the issue
of whether disclosure of material facts "would have led to further inves-
tigation necessary to determine eligibility. ' 53 As one commentator has
noted, the test for materiality developed by the courts "appears to have
been broad. Although it went beyond the showing of a mere potential
to thwart an investigation, it did not require a finding that the investiga-
tion might have revealed possible grounds for denial," but only that an
investigation was actually precluded. 54
The current test as defined by the Supreme Court in Chaunt pro-
vides that a misrepresentation or concealment is material when the gov-
ernment can show "by 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' evidence
either (1) that facts were suppressed which, if known, would have war-
ranted denial of citizenship or (2) that their disclosure might have been
useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts
warranting denial of citizenship." ' 55 The literal language of Chaunt sug-
gests a broad test which would hold the naturalization applicant to strict
accountability for intentional deceptions. 56 Nonetheless, circuit courts
in applying the second prong have disagreed about whether the
53. See Note, Misrepresentation and Materiality, supra note 25, at 480.
The courts held that mere frustration of the investigation was a sufficient
reason for the revocation of citizenship. See, e.g., United States v. De Lucia, 256
F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1958) (use of an assumed name to gain entry is grounds for
deportation "in as much as concealment of one's true name is an effective im-
pediment for an investigation of inquiry relative to the person involved. Had De
Lucia used his own name at all relevant times, a path of inquiry leading to his
criminal record would have been opened to the government."), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 836 (1958); Corrado v. United States, 227 F.2d 780 n.84 (6th Cir. 1955)
("[t]he issue is not whether naturalization would have been denied appellant had
he revealed his numerous arrests, but whether, by his false answers, the govern-
ment was denied the opportunity of investigating the moral character of appel-
lant and the facts relating to his eligibility for citizenship"), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
925 (1956); United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 62 F.2d 808, 816 (7th Cir. 1933)
("[Wihat the officer would have discovered, or might have discovered, had the
inspection not been thwarted is beside the question. The inspection contem-
plated was defeated."), aft'd, 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
54. See Note, Misrepresentation and Materiality, supra note 25, at 486-87 (foot-
note omitted).
55. Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 355. Peter Chaunt, a native of Hungary, became a
naturalized citizen of the United States in 1940. Id. Later, the government dis-
covered that Chaunt had concealed material facts on his petition for naturaliza-
tion. Id. at 351. Specifically, the government alleged that Chaunt had procured
his nationality by concealing the fact that he had been arrested three times. Id.
at 351-52. The government contended that Chaunt's citizenship should be re-
voked under the INA on the ground that it had been procured "by concealment
of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation." Id. at 350-51 (the action was
brought under § 340(a) of the INA. 66 Stat. 260, as amended by 68 Stat. 1232(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) § 340(a) (1982)).
56. Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 357 (1982) (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Clark's
dissent in Chaunt characterized the majority's test as follows: "[t]he test is not
whether the truthful answer in itself, or the facts discovered through an investi-
gation prompted by that answer, would have justified a denial of citizenship. It
is whether the falsification, the misleading of the examining officer, forestalled
1986] 1055
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Supreme Court intended to create such a broad test. 5 7 Despite this con-
fusion among the circuit courts, the Supreme Court, in Fedorenko v.
United States,58 declined to clarify the meaning of the second prong of
the Chaunt test. 59 Although three of the Justices provided interpreta-
an investigation which might have resulted in the defeat of petitioner's application
for naturalization." Id. (emphasis in original).
57. A minority of courts have adopted the strict view, i.e., the government
must show the undisclosed information would "have led to the discovery of facts
warranting the denial of a visa." See, e.g., United States v. Sheshtawy, 714 F.2d
1038, 1040-41 (10th Cir. 1983) (relying onJ. Blackmun's concurring opinion in
Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981)) (answers were material be-
cause they resulted in suppression of facts which if known would have barred
naturalization of defendant).
Other courts have considered such a narrow view to be inappropriate. For
instance, there is an intermediate reading of the second prong of the test which
has been adopted by a number of circuits and is endorsed by the Attorney Gen-
eral. See Note, Misrepresentation and Materiality, supra note 25, at 493-96 (discuss-
ing the Attorney General's Opinion in In re S- & B-C-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 1168
(1961)); United States v. Koziy, 728 F.2d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir.) (facts would
have led to investigation that might have warranted denial of citizenship), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 130 (1984); see also Kassab v. INS, 364 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1966).
The Kassab court noted that
[i]t was not necessary to this finding that it be shown that petitioner
would not have procured his visa if the true facts had been known. It is
sufficient that if the fact ...had been revealed, it might have led to
further action and the discovery of facts which would have justified the
refusal of the visa.
Id. at 807 (emphasis in original).
The Second Circuit has recently adopted a broad reading of the test, requir-
ing only that the government show that "disclosure of the concealed informa-
tion probably would have led to the discovery of facts warranting denial of a visa."
Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435, 442 (2d Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). Maikov-
skis involved misrepresentations made on a visa application. This reading was
recently adopted by the Third Circuit. See United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516
(3d Cir. 1986).
58. 449 U.S. 490 (1981). Fedorenko was born in Ukraine. Id. at 494. He
was drafted into the Soviet Army in June 1941, but was captured shortly thereaf-
ter. Id. He was subsequently trained to be a concentration camp guard, and in
September of 1942 was assigned to the Nazi concentration camp at Treblinka.
Id. at 494. In 1948, Congress enacted the DPA, which allowed European war
refugees to emigrate to the United States without regard to traditional immigra-
tion quotas. Id. at 495. In October 1949, defendant Fedorenko applied for ad-
mission to the United States under the DPA. Id. Fedorenko misrepresented his
background on his visa application, stating that he had been a farmer in Poland
for most of the war, until he was deported to Germany where he was forced to
work in a factory until the end of the hostilities. Id. at 496-97.
The government alleged that Fedorenko would not have been eligible for a
visa under the DPA had the immigration service known he had served as an
armed guard at Treblinka. Id. at 498. The government charged that the defend-
ant had willfully concealed this information both in applying for a DPA visa and
in applying for citizenship, and therefore that he had procured his naturalization
illegally or by willfully misrepresenting material facts. Id.
59. Id. at 509. The Court found that disclosure of the true facts would have
made Fedorenko ineligible to receive a visa under the DPA and therefore it was
not necessary to address the question of whether Chaunt should apply in this
area. Id.
11
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tions of the Chaunt test,60 the majority's refusal to address the issue in
Fedorenko has left this area of law in a state of confusion. 6 1
B. Deportation
A second area of doubt has developed in the deportation cases.
Specifically, courts are unclear as to whether the Chaunt test should ap-
ply at all in visa application cases. The early deportation decisions held
that facts were material if disclosure would have excluded the alien from
entering the United States.6 2 Eventually, the courts developed various
tests which were very similar to the test the Supreme Court would lay
down in Chaunt to determine the materiality of misrepresentations made
on petitions for naturalization.6 3
Thereafter, circuit courts of appeals that addressed the issue
adopted the Chaunt test to determine the materiality of misrepresenta-
tions made on visa applications. 64
In Fedorenko,65 the United States Supreme Court implied that the
standard for determining "materiality" on an application for citizenship
60. Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion stated that the government
must prove disqualifying facts that would have made a party ineligible for citizen-
ship at the time he executed his application. Id. at 523 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). Justice Blackmun apparently took this strict position because he felt that
the Chaunt Court did not intend to create two separate tests and therefore the
first test is controlling. United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986).
Justice Stevens' stated a similar standard but added a third component to
the Chaunt test: whether the disqualifying circumstances "would have been dis-
covered by the investigation." Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice White favored a broader reading of the Chaunt test; a fact is material
if a true response might have "led to the discovery of revealed facts justifying
denial of citizenship." Id. at 528 (White, J., dissenting).
61. See United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that
"[c]onsistent with Justice Blackmun's concern that Fedorenko would generate
confusion, cases that have followed have reached different conclusions concern-
ing the materiality requirements under Chaunt"). See generally Note, Denaturaliza-
tion, supra note 25, at 190-94 (reviewing federal courts' application of Chaunt in
post-Fedorenko denaturalization decisions); Note, Denaturalization and Materiality at
the Visa Application Stage-Fedorenko v. United States, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
255, 262-65 (1982) ("creation of a multiple standard can only further the confu-
sion endangered by Chaunt.") [hereinafter Note, Denaturalization and Materiality].
62. See Note, Misrepresentation and Materiality, supra note 25 at 488. The com-
mentator noted, however, that the courts disagreed as to the proper standard of
materiality in cases where exclusion would not have resulted from disclosure of
the truth. Id.
63. See generally Note, Misrepresentation and Materiality, supra note 25, at 488-
90. Various courts followed the reasoning applied in many denaturalization
cases by stressing the importance of the government's investigation which is hin-
dered by the misrepresentation "regardless of what the inspection might have
uncovered." Id.
64. For a discussion of which courts of appeal have adopted the Chaunt test,
see infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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in denaturalization cases should not be used to determine materiality on
an application for citizenship in deportation cases. 66 Because the
Fedorenko decision is limited to persons who entered the United States in
violation of sections 267 and 1068 of the DPA, it may be read to have
limited precedential value. 69 However, subsequent federal courts apply-
66. 449 U.S. at 509. Justice Marshall's majority opinion questioned
whether the Chaunt test for materiality applies to false statements in visa applica-
tions. Id. In Fedorenko, the Court found that the defendant had violated a statu-
tory condition precedent to naturalization, rendering his certificate of
citizenship revocable as "illegally procured." Id. at 514. The Court held that
Fedorenko had not satisfied a statutory prerequisite for obtaining citizenship by
naturalization because his service as a concentration camp guard rendered him
ineligible for an immigrant visa under the DPA. Id. at 514-15. See generally Note,
Denaturalization, supra note 25, at 181 (Because he was originally ineligible for
admission to the United States under the DPA, "the Court concluded that the
petitioner had never been lawfully admitted and therefore could not have com-
piled five years of residency.").
However, the Court did not directly address whether the Chaunt test is the
proper standard for determining the materiality of misrepresentations made at
the visa application stage. 449 U.S. at 509. For a discussion of the Chaunt test,
see supra note 56 and accompanying text. Specifically, the Court found that be-
cause the disclosure of true facts concerning Fedorenko's role as a concentration
camp guard as a matter of law made him ineligible for a visa under the DPA, it
was not necessary to resolve the Chaunt question. 449 U.S. at 509. The
Supreme Court did note that "[a]t the very least, a misrepresentation must be
considered material if disclosure of the true facts would have made the applicant
ineligible for a visa." Id.
67. 62 Stat. 1009 (1948). Under the DPA only "refugees" or "displaced
persons" who were of concern to the IRO were eligible to enter the United
States. Id. Section 2 of the DPA adopted the definitions of "refugee" and "dis-
placed person" contained in the IRO constitution. Id. The IRO constitution
provides that the following persons were not of concern to the IRO (and thus
not eligible to enter the United States under the DPA): "2. any person who can
be shown: (a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of
countries, members of the United Nations; or (b) to have voluntarily assisted the
enemy forces since the outbreak of the Second World War in their operations
against the United States." 62 Stat. 3048, 3051 (1943).
In Fedorenko, the Court took a strict statutory construction approach and
held that "[u]nder traditional principles of statutory construction, the deliberate
omission of the word 'voluntary' from § 2(a) compels the conclusion that the
statute made all those who assisted in the persecution of civilians [whether vol-
untarily or involuntarily] ineligible for visa." 449 U.S. at 512 (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
68. 62 Stat. 1009, 1013 (1948). Section 10 of the DPA provided: "any
person who shall willfully make a misrepresentation for the purpose of gaining
admission into the United States as an eligible displaced person shall thereafter
not be admissible into the United States." Id.
69. Comment, Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals: Is There Sufficient Justice
for Those Who Would not Dispense Justice? 40 MD. L. REV. 39, 84-85 (1981)
("[R]ealistically the opinion will be binding only in future war criminal denatu-
ralizations because it is expressly based on statutory interpretation of the DPA,
not on the interpretation of the immigration statutes which affect the majority of
naturalized citizens.")
In Fedorenko, the Court held that an applicant who willfully made material
misrepresentations about his war time activities was ineligible under § 10 of the
13
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ing Fedorenko have extended its holding to apply to persons who entered
the United States in violation of other provisions of the DPA.70 Further-
more, despite the contrary implication in Fedorenko, a number of federal
courts have continued to assume that Chaunt is the appropriate test for
determining materiality at the visa application stage.
7
'
In United States v. Kowalchuk, 72 a denaturalization case, 73 the Third
DPA. 449 U.S. at 507. The Court held that misrepresented or concealed facts
would be material where, if the true facts were known, the applicant would have
been ineligible for a visa under § 2 of the DPA. Id. at 512-14.
70. Note, Denaturalization, supra note 25, at 183 (citing United States v. Lin-
nas, 527 F. Supp. 426, 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F.
Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (section 13 of the DPA rendered defendant ineli-
gible due to his assistance in civil persecution), aff'd, 630 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 1036 (1982); 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (1982) (lack of good moral
character evidenced by atrocities committed)). See also United States v. Osidach,
513 F. Supp. 51, 72 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("[U]nder § 13 of the DPA mere willing
membership-without proof of personal participation in acts of persecution-in
a movement that persecuted civilians is sufficient to warrant a finding of ineligi-
bility as a displaced person.")
71. See, e.g., United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986); United
States v. Palciauskas, 734 F.2d 625, 627-28 (11 th Cir. 1984) (immigrant who cuts
off government investigation into his background by failing to disclose a mate-
rial fact is hereafter barred from entering the United States); United States v.
Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 1254, 1267-68 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (dicta) (recognizing that
Chaunt has been used by lower courts to define materiality in visa application
stage).
72. 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1188
(1986). In Kowalchuk, the defendant's citizenship was revoked on the grounds
that his naturalization had been illegally procured by concealment of a material
fact or willful misrepresentation under § 1451(a) of the INA. Id. at 496.
In 1949, Serge Kowalchuk obtained a visa to enter the United States for
permanent residence as a non-quota immigrant under the DPA. Id. at 492. In
1960, Kowalchuk became a United States citizen. Id. The government sued
under the INA to revoke Kowalchuk's citizenship on the grounds that he had
made false and misleading statements on his visa application. Id. at 492-93.
Specifically the government alleged:
(1) Kowalchuk concealed his membership in the Ukranian
schutzmannschaft by falsely stating that he was a tailor's assistant in
Kremianec from 1939 to 1944. [The schutzmannschaft was a branch of
the Ukranian militia organized by the Germans shortly after occupying
Lubomyl, Poland in 1941. The Germans organized such forces to help
carry out their brutal policies.]
(4) He concealed his voluntary departure with the retreating German
military forces from Lubomyl to Czechoslovakia, by falsely stating that
he left his homeland because he was forcibly transported by the
Germans.
(5) In response to a question concerning membership in any political,
non-political, or para-military organization, he falsely replied 'none,'
thereby concealing his membership in the schutzmannschaft.
Id. at 492 (footnote omitted).
73. The government sought to have Kowalchuk denaturalized on the
grounds that a grant of citizenship is invalid if the applicant had not been law-
fully admitted into the United States pursuant to a valid visa. Id. at 492-93 (cit-
ing 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982)). The Fedorenko court had held that where the
14
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Circuit recently had occasion to determine the "materiality" of a misrep-
resentation made at the visa application stage.7" Despite the fact that
the Fedorenko opinion contained explicit language to the contrary, 75 the
Third Circuit assumed that the test for materiality developed in that
case 76 was nothing more than application of the first prong of Chaunt
which states that the Government must show by "clear, unequivocal,
and convincing" evidence that "facts were suppressed which, if known,
would have warranted denial of citizenship. ' 7 7 Finding that Kowalchuk
preconditions to naturalization are not met, citizenship is "illegally procured"
and may be revoked. 449 U.S. at 506. The Third Circuit found that had
Kowalchuk revealed the true facts, his visa would have been denied. Kowalchuk,
773 F.2d at 496. Since possession of a validly obtained visa is a precondition to
naturalization that denial would have "thereby precluded him from obtaining
citizenship." Id. at 496. Specifically, the Third Circuit found that Kowalchuk had
improperly been granted an immigrant visa in violation of §§ 2 and 13 of the
DPA, Id. at 494-97. For a discussion of § 2 of the DPA, see supra note 67.
Section 13 of the DPA provides: "no visa shall be issued under the provi-
sions of the Act to any person who is or has been a member of or participated in
any movement which is or has been hostile to the United States. 62 Stat.
1014 (1948).
The Third Circuit further found, among other material facts, that the de-
fendant had willfully concealed his voluntary membership in the Ukranian
schutzmannschaft. 773 F.2d 498. An applicant who has voluntarily assisted the
enemy was ineligible for a visa under § 2 of the DPA. For a discussion of § 2,
see supra note 67. Michael R. Thomas, chief eligibility officer for the IRO, stated
that an applicant who has belonged to a police force or militia would be pre-
sumed to voluntarily have assisted the enemy. 773 F.2d at 496. Thomas' testi-
mony was corroborated by a senior reviewing officer of the Displaced Persons
Commission (DPC) as well as a former American Vice Counsel who both testi-
fied that a member of the schutzmannschaft who could not overcome the pre-
sumption of voluntariness, i.e., show that he was not involved in persecution of
civilians, would have been ineligible for a visa. Id. at 496-97. Thus, the Third
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision revoking Kowalchuk's citizenship.
Id. at 498.
74. Id. at 494-96.
The court noted that in order to become a citizen an applicant must have
entered the United States pursuant to a valid visa. Id. at 494. Furthermore, the
court recognized that it was undisputed that Kowalchuk "willfully ma[d]e a mis-
representation for the purpose of gaining admission into the United States as an
eligible displaced person." Id. at 495 (quoting § 10 of the DPA). The Third
Circuit recognized that under the Fedorenko Court's interpretation of § 10 of the
DPA, any person who misrepresented a material fact was thereafter not admissi-
ble into the United States. Id. at 495 n.8. The Third Circuit was faced with the
task of determining the materiality of Kowalchuk's misrepresentation.
75. The Supreme Court, in Fedorenko, held that the defendant had not satis-
fied a statutory requirement which was a prerequisite to becoming a naturalized
citizen. 449 U.S. at 515. The Court went on to state that "[t]his conclusion...
lead[s] us to affirm on statutory grounds (and not on the basis of our decision in
Chaunt), the judgment of the Court of Appeals." Id. at 516. Since the Court had
not applied Chaunt it was unnecessary to reach the issue of determining the
proper interpretation of the Chaunt test. Id. at 518 n.40.
76. For a discussion of the Fedorenko test, see supra note 66 and accompany-
ing text.
77. The Third Circuit noted that in Fedorenko the Court did not decide
1060
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had violated the first prong of Chaunt by concealing facts that would
have warranted denial of his visa, the Third Circuit determined that the
plaintiff had failed to gain legitimate entry into the United States. 78 Fol-
lowing Fedorenko, the Kowalchuk court reasoned that since legitimate en-
try was a precondition to naturalization, failure to meet that
precondition to naturalization was grounds for revoking the plaintiff's
citizenship. 79 Chief Judge Aldisert, writing for the dissent, agreed that
the Chaunt test was appropriate for use in visa application cases, but of-
fered a variant interpretation of both prongs. 80
Similarly, the Second Circuit, in Maikovskis v. United States,8 1 an alien
deportation case, recently addressed the issue of whether Chaunt applies
to misrepresentations made on visa applications. 82 The Second Circuit
whether Chaunt applies to determine the materiality of false statements made on
visa applications. The court then noted the Fedorenko reasoning that "[a]t the
very least, a misrepresentation must be considered material if disclosure of the
true facts would have made the applicant ineligible for a visa." 773 F.2d at 496
(quoting Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 509). Nevertheless,Judge Rosenn's opinion con-
cluded that "[b]ecause ... disclosure of the true facts concerning defendant's
war-time activities would have made him ineligible for a visa, wefind it unnecessary
to resolve the question of whether defendant's misrepresentations were material under the sec-
ond prong of the Chaunt test." Id. at 497 (emphasis added) (citing Fedorenko, 449
U.S. at 509). Therefore, it is submitted that the court had replaced the Fedorenko
test with the first prong of Chaunt thereby applying Chaunt at the visa application
stage. See also United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986) (clarifying
that in Kowalchuk, Third Circuit upheld revoking of a defendant's citizenship af-
ter applying the first prong of the Chaunt test).
It should be noted that a number of commentators have also seen the simi-
larity between the Fedorenko test and the first prong of Chaunt. See Note, Denatu-
ralization, supra note 25, at 182 (noting that the "tests of Fedorenko and Chaunt
seem remarkably similar"); Note, Denaturalization and Materiality, supra note 61, at
262 ("[T]he Court gave no explanation for its refusal to apply Chaunt, yet the
standard of materiality it adopted for deportation review ... bears a strong re-
semblance to the first test of Chaunt."); see also Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 520 (Black-
mun, J., concurring) (the minimal definition announced by the majority "bears
no small resemblance to the first test of Chaunt").
78. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 496.
79. Id. at 494 (citing Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506).
80. Id. at 514-15. (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Aldisert, in his
dissent, concluded that the government did not satisfy the first prong of the
Chaunt test. Id. at 514 (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting). Aldisert recognized that
"[w]hat has divided the courts of appeals in visa application cases is not the
applicability of Chaunt, but rather the import of the second prong of Chaunt's
denaturalization test." Id. at 515 (Aldisert, CJ., dissenting). Therefore, unlike
the majority, Aldisert found it necessary to reach the meaning of the second
prong.
Applying the known prong of Chaunt, Aldisert concluded that the govern-
ment must prove that, "had the undisclosed facts been known, an investigation
would have been conducted and disqualifying facts would have been discov-
ered." Aldisert found that the government had not met its burden under the
second prong of Chaunt and therefore concluded the district court should be
reversed. Id. at 516 (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting).
81. 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2915 (1986).
82. Id. at 437. Boleslaus Maikovskis entered the United States in 1951 as a
16
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noted that despite the Fedorenko Court's intimations to the contrary, 8 3
the circuit courts of appeals addressing the issue have uniformly held
that Ciaunt does so apply.8 4 Accordingly, the Second Circuit relied on
the Chaunt test in determining that Maikovskis' statements were material
and thus that he was an "excludable alien." 8 5
Despite the uniformity among the circuit courts of appeals, it has
been suggested that "[t]he Fedorenko standard should be applied to de-
termine an applicant's initial entry while the Chaunt test is to be used to
determine an applicant's eligibility for citizenship." '86 District courts al-
legedly adopting this position in practice have had difficulty limiting ap-
plication of Chaunt to situations where there is no question of lawful
entry. 8
7
For the reasons discussed below, it is submitted that the Supreme
Court should dispel the doubts created by Justice Marshall's majority
opinion in Fedorenko and recognize that the circuit courts have properly
applied the Chaunt test to determine materiality of misrepresentations
displaced person. Id. On his application for an immigrant visa, Maikovskis
stated that he had worked as a bookkeeper in a Latvian railway department dur-
ing the war. Id. The government brought an action under the "excludable
alien" provision of the INA to deport Maikovskis, alleging that he had actually
been "chief of police in a nazi-dominated police force" and therefore that he
had made materially false statements on his visa application. Id. at 438. The
excludable alien provision provides for the deportation of any alien who "at the
time of entry was within one or more of the classes of aliens excludable by the
law existing at the time of such entry." 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
83. Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 441. For a discussion of the Court's refusal to
deal with the issue whether Chaunt applies in deportation cases, see supra note 66
and accompanying text.
84. See Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 441 (citing United States v. Fedorenko, 597
F.2d 946, 957 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 490 (1981));
Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 488 (misrepresentations made on applicant's immigration
visa were material under first prong of Chaunt test); United States v. Palciauskas,
734 F.2d 628 (11 th Cir. 1984) (misrepresentation is material where disclosure
would have led to further inquiry into applicant's background); Kassab v. INS,
364 F.2d 806, 807 (6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir.
1962); Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642, 648 (1st Cir. 1961).
85. Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 442. The court held that a misrepresentation is
material under the second prong of Chaunt if the government shows that "disclo-
sure of the concealed information probably would have led to the discovery of
facts warranting the denial of a visa." Id.
86. Note, Denaturalization, supra note 25, at 190.
87. Id. at 192. In United States v. Demjanjuk, the court applied Fedorenko in
order to determine the materiality of a misrepresentation made on a visa-appli-
cation under the DPA. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1382-83
(N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd, 630 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1036 (1982).
However, when the court examined the materiality of misrepresentations made
on Demjanjuk's petition for naturalization, the court adopted the Chaunt test to
determine whether Demjanjuk had lawfully been admitted into the United
States. 518 F. Supp. at 1383; see also United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (defendant's entry into United States was unlawful under
Fedorenko; examined lawfulness of entry under Chaunt).
1062 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1046
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made at the visa application stage as well as at the naturalization stage.8 8
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE CHAUNT TEST
The Supreme Court can affect a significant change by clarifying the
meaning of the second prong of the Chaunt test which has generated
confusion among the federal courts since it was enunciated in 1961.89
Courts, commentators and government officials have offered no less
than three interpretations of the second prong of the Chaunt test.90 In
determining whether a broad or narrow interpretation of the test should
be adopted, most courts consider the following two factors: (1) The se-
riousness of the consequences to the citizen or alien if a misrepresenta-
tion made at an earlier stage is found to have been material, 91 or
(2) Whether the misrepresentation made at an earlier stage resulted in a
shift of burden of proof to the government at a point where it makes it
more difficult to show the applicant's ineligibility for a visa.9 2 This note
88. See Note, Denaturalization, supra note 25, at 190-94.
89. Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 435 (although courts of appeals have uniformly
applied the Chaunt test, there is disagreement as to the meaning of the second
prong of the test); cf. United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986) (not-
ing that Supreme Court has never explained second prong of Chaunt test); see
also Case Comment, supra note 21, at 182 ("[C]larification of Chaunt would go far
toward settling the current confusion in this area of law."); Note, Denaturaliza-
tion, supra note 25, at 177 ("the two-prong Chaunt test in particular the second
prong has faced criticism as being confusing."); Note, Misrepresentation and Mate-
riality, supra note 25, at 493 ("confusion arose immediately as to the meaning of
the second test"); Note, Denaturalization and Materiality, supra note 61, at 261-63
(recognizing the confusion and disagreement which has surrounded the Chaunt
test).
90. See United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that
the Second Circuit has recognized three possible tests under which materiality
can be proven, a "might possible", a "reasonable possibility" or a "certainty"
standard). For a discussion of the various interpretations of the Chaunt test, see
supra note 57 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Note, Misrepresentation and Materiality, supra note 25, at 495
("[S]everity of denaturalization and deportation demands a standard higher
than that connoted by 'possibly' "); Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 521-23 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("Rigorous test is necessary to preserve person's unique and trea-
sured right to citizenship.").
92. See, e.g., Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 442 ("If material facts have successfully
been concealed in the visa application documents . . .the concealment has de-
prived the government of the opportunity to make an investigation ... at a time
when the truth would have been more easily discovered."); Fedorenko, 597 F.2d
at 951 (district court's interpretation requiring the government to prove ulti-
mate facts "would allow an applicant for a visa or citizenship to lie about his
background and thereby prevent the government from investigating his fitness
at a time when he has the burden of proving eligibility."); Langhammer v. Ham-
ilton, 295 F.d 642, 648 (Ist Cir. 1961) (Requiring government to show there
would have been investigation that would have resulted in applicant's ineligibil-
ity "invites false swearing.").
The Third Circuit found that "although there is no controlling authority
which requires us to insist that the government prove that the truth at the time
would have prompted an investigation we find that this requirement is implied
1986] 1063
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will consider how these two factors should be evaluated in light of the
current trends and concerns surrounding immigration policy.
Some courts have indicated that the proper interpretation of the
Chaunt test should be determined by examining the effect that the appli-
cant's misrepresentation has on the government's ability to assess the
applicant's eligibility.93 These courts generally base their reasoning on
the fact that at the time of entering the United States, or at the time of
petitioning for citizenship, the applicant has the burden of proving eligi-
bility.94 In a deportation or denaturalization hearing, the government
has the burden of proving ineligibility by clear, unequivocal and con-
vincing evidence. 95 In view of the fact that generally many years have
passed since the alien's entrance into the United States and because evi-
dence is sometimes in the hands of foreign countries, it is often very
difficult for the government to meet its burden of proof.9 6 A number of
courts have concluded that, as a result, applicants are encouraged to lie
or conceal facts concerning their eligibility.9 7 Consequently, these
by the language of the second prong: 'that disclosure might have been useful in
an investigation.' ". United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516, 526 (3d Cir. 1986)
(citing Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 355).
93. For a discussion of the courts which have held that the main factor to be
considered is the hindering of a government investigation, see supra note 92.
94. See IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 2, § 3.71 (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1361 (1982)). The "Burden of Proof" section of the INA provides in
pertinent part: "[wihenever any person makes application for a visa . . . or
otherwise attempts to enter the United States, the burden of proof shall be upon
such person to establish that he is eligible to receive such visa. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1982).
95. See 1A C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 2, § 5.10(b). Although
the document which "initiates the deportation proceeding" asserts that the re-
spondent must prove why he should not be deported, it is the government which
seeks to expel the alien and which "therefore has the burden of proving eligibil-
ity." Id. However, where the lawfulness of entry is in question, "the burden of
proof shall be upon such person to show the time, place, and manner of his
entry into the United States . . . If such burden of proof is not sustained, such
person shall be presumed to be in the United States in violation of the law." Id.
The burden then shifts to the government to show that the entry was unlawful.
Id. The government must meet this burden by clear, unequivocal and convinc-
ing evidence. Id. (citing Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966)).
96. See Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 442. ("Maikovskis' misrepresentations cut
off a relevant line of inquiry, preventing the immigration authorities from con-
ducting a thorough investigation of his background to determine his eligibility
on the basis of complete information."); Fedorenko, 587 F.2d at 951 (rigorous
reading of Chaunt would force government to attempt to "conduct an investiga-
tion into the past, discover ultimate facts warranting disqualification, and prove
those facts in court by clear and convincing evidence").
97. See, e.g., Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 442 ("[A]pplication of a certainty stan-
dard would encourage the alien to conceal material information in his visa appli-
cation documents and reward him for the initial success of his nondisclosure.");
Fedorenko, 597 F.2d at 951 ("[If rigorous test] were the law, an applicant with
something to hide would have everything to gain and nothing to lose by lying
under oath to the INS."); Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642 (1st Cir.
1962) ("A decision that an alien may make a false statement in his application
1064 [Vol. 31: p. 1046
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courts have adopted a broad interpretation of the Chaunt test. 98 The At-
torney General has offered a similar interpretation of this provision.9 9
It is submitted that courts are correct in recognizing that a misrep-
resentation or concealment of facts by the applicant will effectively cut
off government investigation since, as many courts and commentators
have noted, the INS does not have adequate resources to launch an in-
vestigation of each apparently legitimate visa petition.' 0 0 However, it
for a visa in order to avoid the raising of a substantial question as to his eligibil-
ity and then, if he is caught in the false statement after having successfully
choked off investigation, may try out his eligibility just as if nothing happened
would . . .be an invitation to false swearing." (quoting Ganduxe Y. Marino v.
Murff, 183 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd sub nom. Ganduxe y Marino v.
Esperdy, 278 F.2d 330 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960)).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986) (After
proving investigation would have transpired, government must prove that inves-
tigation "probably would have led to discovery of disqualifying facts"; court did
not address whether it would be sufficient for government to show that disquali-
fying facts possibly would have been revealed (emphasis in original)); Maikovskis,
773 F.2d at 442 (in adopting the most liberal view, Second Circuit held that
government must show that "disclosure of the concealed information probably
would have led to the discovery of facts warranting the denial of a visa." (empha-
sis added)); Fedorenko, 597 F.2d at 951 (government must show that disclosure of
true facts would have led to an inquiry that might have uncovered other facts
warranting denial of citizenship); Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642, 648
(1st Cir. 1961) (sufficient to find material if "inquiry" would "have unearthed
facts warranting [defendant's] exclusion regardless of the ultimate determination
of this question when all the evidence was in." (emphasis in original)).
99. See generally Federal Immigration L. Rep. 11,099 § 42.9 1(a)(19), 4-44
to 45 (1983). Materiality means more then than an alien has lied, rather it is
measured against "whether the misrepresentation was of direct and objective
significance to the proper resolution of the alien's application for a visa." Id. at
4-44. The Attorney General has stated that the definition of materiality under
§ 1182 is:
A misrepresentation made in connection with an application for a
visa or other documents, or with entry into the United States, is mate-
rial if either
(1) the alien is excludable on the true facts, or
(2) the misrepresentation tends to shut a line of inquiry which is
relevant to the alien's eligibility and which might well have resulted in a
proper determination that he be excluded.
Id. (citing In re S- & B- C-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 1168 (1961)). Part one of the definition
applies where "the true facts of the matter disclose a situation rendering the
alien ipsofacto ineligible for a visa as a matter of law." Id. The second part of the
definition applies where the alien's misrepresentation "tended to shut off a line
of inquiry which is relevant to his visa eligibility." Id. There has developed a
"rule of probability" whereby a misrepresentation is material where it was "in-
tended to cut off a line of inquiry into facts which might have resulted in a
proper refusal of a visa if the truth had been known." Id. The misrepresentation
need not have been successful in thwarting the government's investigation, as
long as "it must reasonably have had the capacity of foreclosing further investi-
gation." Id.
100. See, e.g., Maikovskis, 773 F.2d at 442; Fedorenko, 597 F.2d at 951;
Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642, 648 (1st Cir. 1961). The United States
has consular officers stationed in foreign countries who are responsible for
"screening visa applicants and for issuing visas to those who qualify." See M.
20
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has also been suggested that regardless of whether a broad or narrow
test is adopted some applicants for entry into the United States will lie
or conceal facts which would, if known, prevent admittance; as one com-
mentator suggests "[w]here an applicant fears that the truth will result
in denial or perhaps even more drastic consequences, such as repatria-
tion to a hostile homeland . . . the incentive to lie is already strongly
present. An adjustment in esoteric law will little alter real world beha-
viour."10 1 Therefore, although the Court in fashioning an interpreta-
tion of Chaunt should consider the extent to which the government's
investigation is hindered, it is submitted that this should not be the de-
terminative factor.
In determining the proper standard of materiality in denaturaliza-
tion and deportation proceedings, it is submitted that the interpretation
the Court chooses to give the second prong of the Chaunt test will de-
pend on whether the Court emphasizes the loss of the applicant if the
misrepresentation is found material, or the gain which the applicant has
achieved by making a material misrepresentation. 102
InJohnnessen v. United States,10 3 the first denaturalization case involv-
ing fraud or illegal procurement of citizenship, the Supreme Court em-
phasized that there is no legal right to retain citizenship which has been
procured by giving "false evidence."' 1 4 More recently, the Court em-
phasized that because the attainment of American citizenship is "a sol-
emn affair", an applicant must give "frank, honest and unequivocal
answers." 10 5 The Court went further to emphasize that failure to do so
can lead to a denial of citizenship. 10 6 However, in the same opinion the
MORRISS, IMMIGRATION-THE BELEAGURED BUREAUCRACY 96 (1985). Although
the number of visas issued increased by only 13 percent between 1972 and 1979,
the number of applicants has grown more rapidly. Id. Consequently, in 1983
there was a "mounting backlog [of visa applications] that exceeded 1.4 million."
Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, the number of immigrant visas has steadily
increased, almost tripling in number from 1972-1980. Id. In addition to sheer
numbers, evidence suggests that fraud in visa petitions is a substantial problem
in some areas. Id. at 98. In light of these problems, more personnel are needed
as well as improved facilities before the system can function satisfactorily. Id.
101. See Case Comment, supra note 21, at 199; see also United States v.
Sheshtawy, 714 F.2d 1038, 1090 (10th Cir. 1983) (narrow reading of Chaunt
would not increase prevalence of lying).
102. For a discussion of the various interpretations of the Chaunt test, see
supra notes 57 & 98-99 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Kungys,
793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that there are three interpretations that
various circuits have given to the second prong of the Chaunt test).
103. 225 U.S. 227 (1912).
104. Id. at 241. The Court concluded that if it is determined that an alien
has been granted citizenship through his unlawful conduct, then denaturaliza-
tion is merely depriving him "of a privilege that was never rightfully his." Id. at
242-43.
105. Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 352. Truthful answers are necessary to insure that
the government can adequately assess whether the applicant is qualified to be-
come a United States citizen. Id.
106. Id. at 352-53. The Court noted that "[s]uppressed or concealed facts,
1066 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1046
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Court also recognized that in light of the "grave consequences to the
citizen, naturalization decrees are not likely to be set aside."' 1 7 Lower
courts that have emphasized the former view have given the second
prong of Chaunt a broad interpretation, thus requiring the highest de-
gree of candor from the applicant.' 0 8 Courts that have emphasized the
latter view, on the other hand, have given the second prong of Chaunt a
narrow interpretation, making it much more difficult for the government
to satisfy its burden of proof.10 9
V. APPLICABILITY OF CHAUNT AT THE VISA APPLICATION STAGE
Notably, the first courts of appeals to apply the two prong Chaunt
test did so in cases involving misrepresentations made on visa applica-
tions.1 0 For instance, in Rossi v. United States,' the Ninth Circuit
stated that Chaunt applied at the visa application stage because "naturali-
zation is the final step in the process which begins with entry, and thus
what is material in completing the process depends on what was material
in initiating it." 11' 2 More recently, in Fedorenko, Justice Blackmun sug-
gested in his concurrence that in determining the materiality of facts, the
relevant consideration is not when or where the concealment or misrep-
resentation occurred; rather the relevant consideration is whether mate-
rial facts concerning the applicant's eligibility for citizenship were
if known, might in and of themselves justify denial of citizenship. Or disclosure
of the true facts might have led to the discovery of other facts which would jus-
tify denial of citizenship." Id.
107. Id. at 353.
108. See, e.g., Fedorenko, 597 F.2d at 952 ("To guard the integrity of this
priceless treasured citizenship, the government must be accorded the authority
to seek the denaturalization of those who, in procuring citizenship, misstated or
concealed facts that, if disclosed, would have led the government to conduct an
inquiry that might have resulted in denial of citizenship."); United States v.
Oddo, 314 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1963) (Recognizing that right to American
citizenship is a "precious one"; government meets its high burden of proof by
showing that misrepresentation cut off a line of inquiry by government "which
might have conceivably led to collateral information of greater relevance").
109. United States v. Sheshtawy, 714 F.2d 1038, 1041 (10th Cir. 1983)
("The importance of putting naturalized citizenship well beyond the danger of
unwarranted revocation justifies the adoption of so severe a test," such that the
government must establish facts that would have warranted denial of applicant's
citizenship); United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1962).
110. See United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962) (statements
made in visa applications must meet evidentiary test of Chaunt to be material);
Longhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642 (1st Cir. 1961) (defendant who lied
about his communist membership on application for visa was not eligible to
enter the United States under first prong of Chaunt).
111. 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962). Cesare Rossi, who was admitted to the
United States under a non-quota visa, became a United States citizen in 1935.
Id. The government alleged that Rossi's actions constituted fraud and justified
revocation of his citizenship. Id.
112. Id. at 652.
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concealed from the government.' 1 3 It is submitted that both the Ninth
Circuit and Justice Blackmun were implicitly recognizing that naturaliza-
tion is the ultimate goal for a significant number of persons who enter
the United States under immigrant visas.' 14 In fact, the same misrepre-
sentation used by an applicant to obtain a visa are often repeated on the
applicant's petition for United States citizenship.' 1 5 In addition, it is
submitted that Congress has established a strong legislative policy favor-
ing truthfulness which applies equally to representations made on peti-
tions for citizenship. 1 16
It is submitted that there is little precedent suggesting that a uni-
form standard of materiality should not be applied in immigration
law.11 7 Shortly after the Chaunt decision was announced, one commen-
tator did suggest that because of the high burden of proof required in a
denaturalization action, the test might not be applicable to deportation
actions brought for misrepresentations made on visa applications., 18
However, this proposition, which was never recognized by any of the
circuit courts of appeal, lost any chance of adoption when the Supreme
Court held in Woodby v. INS 119, that owing to the severe consequences
113. 449 U.S. at 520 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
114. See M. MORRISS, supra note 100, at 126. Morriss noted that although
less than one third of those immigrants who legally enter the United States, i.e.,
who enter under immigrant visas, seek to become naturalized citizens, during
the decade of the 70's, the number of persons naturalized annually increased by
46%. Id. Morriss further noted that as overall immigration increases, so does
the demand for naturalization. Id. In 1980 alone, 157,938 persons were natu-
ralized. Id. By 1982 the number had reached 183,000. ANNUAL REPORT OF IM-
MIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE 16 (1982).
115. Note, Denaturalization, supra note 25, at 181.
116. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1753, 1755. A conference report, compiled by the
Managers of the Part of the House stated that in "applying fair humanitarian
standards" in cases involving aliens who procured their visas by fraud or misrep-
resenting material facts, "every effort is made to prevent the evasions of the laws
by fraud and to protect the interest of the United States." Id. This strong legis-
lative policy favoring truthfulness has been recognized in naturalization cases as
well. See Case Comment, supra note 21, at 172 (citing Appleman, supra note 25);
see also 2 Federal Immigration L. Rep., supra note 37, at 11,099 § 42.91(a)(19),
43-43 ("The inclusion of [§ 1183] expresses the concern with which Congress
viewed cases of aliens resorting to fraud or willful misrepresentation for the pur-
poses of obtaining visas or otherwise effecting unauthorized entry into the
United States.").
117. Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in Fedorenko, stated that
there was no reason to suggest that Chaunt does not apply to false statements
made at the time of initial entry into the United States. 449 U.S. at 519 (Black-
mun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun went on to observe that "[i]f such a dis-
tinction was intended, it has eluded the several courts that unquestionably have
applied Chaunt's materiality standard when reviewing alleged disturbances in the
visa request process." Id.
118. Appleman, supra note 25, at 272.
119. 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
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to the alien, 120 the government must meet the same high burden of
proof in a deportation action that is required in an action to revoke
citizenship. 121
Finally, in light of the existing authority and precedent, it is submit-
ted that the Supreme Court should follow the "will of Congress"'122 by
recognizing that the circuit courts of appeals have properly applied
Chaunt to determine the materiality of misrepresentations made on visa
applications.123 In so doing, the Court can create uniformity amongst
all the circuits and thus insure that all persons subject to denaturaliza-
tion or deportation proceedings are treated equally.
The remainder of this note will address the question of the proper
view for the court to adopt in light of the current national policy regard-
ing immigration and naturalization.
VI. LEGISLATIVE CONCERNS UNDERLYING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
CHAUNT TEST
In recent years, both the Congress and the executive branch of gov-
ernment have determined that there must be a change in the field of
immigration and naturalization. 124 Consequently, on July 30, 1981,
President Reagan offered a "reform package designed to reassert con-
trol over immigration."1 2 5 In March of 1982, Alan Simpson, the Repub-
120. Id. at 285-86. The Court stated that "[t]he immediate hardship of de-
portation is often greater than that inflicted by denaturalization which does not,
immediately at least, result in expulsion from our shores." Id. at 286.
121. Id. at 285-86. In order to deport an alien, the Court held that the
government must "establish its allegations by clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence." Id. at 285 (footnote omitted).
122. See Comment, Denaturalization Proceedings, 14 CONN. L. REV. 409, 423
(1982). This commentator suggested that the Fedorenko Court defeated Con-
gressional intent regarding naturalization. Id. The commentator concluded that
had the Fedorenko Court "applied and interpreted the Chaunt materiality test, it
could have followed the will of Congress and developed a uniform standard for
considering all instances of material misrepresentations or omissions in denatu-
ralization proceedings." Id. The commentator suggested that the Court relied
on Congress' "exclusive prerogative to set standards for naturalization and the
natural and plain meaning of a word in the statute." Id. However, in doing so,
the Court actually defeated Congressional intent by not affirming that there is a
uniform standard "for considering all instances of material misrepresentation or
omissions in denaturalization proceedings." Id.
123. See, e.g., Note, Denaturalization and Materiality, supra note 61, at 262
("ostensibly Chaunt should be controlling in Fedorenho"); Case Comment, supra
note 21 at 174-82.
124. Abrams, American Immigration Policy-How Straight the Gate?, in U.S. IM-
MIGRATION POLICY 107 (R. Hofstetter ed. 1984). For a discussion of recent Con-
gressional efforts in this area, see COMMirrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 18-28.
125. Martin & Houston, European and American Immigration Policies, in U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY 50 (R. Hofstetter ed. 1984); see 17 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc.
830 (Aug. 3, 1981). Present Reagan's proposed bill dealt almost exclusively with
proposals to alleviate the problem of undocumentated aliens. Martin & Hous-
ton, supra, at 50-51.
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lican Chairman of the Immigration subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and Romano Mazzoli, a Democrat who held the similar
House position, introduced the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill, a "bipartisan re-
sponse" to proposals of President Reagan. 12 6 Although the Simpson-
Mazzoli Bill1 2 7 has yet to be approved, there has been significant Con-
gressional debate on the issue, focusing on a number of specific
concerns.
One of the major concerns of Congress is the number of immi-
grants which the United States can "prudently allow."' 128 In 1965, Con-
gress established a worldwide annual quota of 290,000 immigrants. 129
The 1980 Refugee Act increased the world wide limitation to 320,000
immigrants annually. 130 In addition, the INA provides that certain per-
sons can be admitted to the United States without regard to the quota
limitations.131 In 1980 alone, over 800,000 legal immigrants entered
the United States.' 32 Consequently, "[miuch of the debate about immi-
gration reform rests on the assumption that the country is seriously
threatened by an unprecedented surge in immigration and that steps
must be taken immediately to prevent dire consequences for the
country." 133
The Simpson-Mazzoli Bill sought to control legal immigration by
126. MARTIN & HOUSTON, supra note 125, at 51 (citing S. 2222, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S221 8-19, 4941-43 (daily ed. March 17, 1982) (Sum-
mary of Bill)). The Simpson-Mazzoli Bill went further than the administration's
by seeking to control legal immigration as well as illegal immigration. Id. at 52.
127. The bill is currently known as the Simpson-Rodino Bill. See Student
Lawyer 27 (Jan. 1986). The House passed the Bill June 20, 1984. See M. MOR-
RISS, supra note 100, at 2. However, support for the Bill subsequently collapsed
and it did not pass the Senate before the 98th Congress adjourned. Id. at 3.
128. M. MORRISS, supra note 100, at 3. Morriss noted that the area of immi-
gration policy has always been controversial. Id. He went on to point out two
major competing interests: 1) fears about potential harmful effects of immigra-
tion; and 2) commitment to the idea of an open country. Id. Morriss also noted
that some special interest groups, e.g., certain employers, desire a liberal immi-
gration policy. Id.
129. See Abrams, supra note 124, at 110.
130. 74 Stat. 102, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 141, 155.
131. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982). See also M. MORRISS, supra note 100. Morriss
noted that some categories of immigrants, such as spouses, children and parents
of United States citizens, have always been considered for admission without
regard to numerical quotas. Id. Additionally, Congress has authorized the ad-
mission of several groups of refugees over and above the existing ceiling. Id.
132. See Abrams, supra note 124, at 112 (based on Immigration and Natural-
ization Service statistics, cited in Time, May 18, 1981 at 4). The 800,000 figure
includes 145,000 Cubans and Haitians. See COMMIrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at
4.
133. See M. MORRISS, supra note 100, at 6. Morriss stated that the Senate
version of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill responded to this assumption by proposing
a cap on all imigration. Id. However, Morriss concluded that the country "is not
about to be engulfed by a great alien tide." Id. at 7.
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capping the total number of immigrants at 425,000 annually.' 3 4
Although the Senate and public in general have shown strong support
for such proposals, the House has been reluctant to change America's
current, more liberal immigration policy.' 3 5 Despite approval by the
Senate, the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill died in conference when Congress ad-
journed in October, 1985.136 Recent proposed legislation has empha-
sized enforcing restrictions on illegal immigration rather than changing
United States legal immigration policy. 13 7 Some authorities have ar-
gued that if such efforts are effective, the United States might actually be
able to increase the quotas for legal immigrants.138
It is submitted that the strong legislative emphasis placed on con-
trol of immigration and the strong public opinion favoring immigration
controls in general could shape the Court's interpretation of Chaunt.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in two recent cases has once again refused to
134. S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 3080, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985) (cited in Martin and Houston, supra note 125, at 52). This figure would
include numerally unrestricted immediate relatives and other non-quota immi-
grants whose numbers have been steadily increasing.
135. See M. MORRISS, supra note 100, at 3. The Senate version of the Simp-
son-Mazzoli bill called for an annual ceiling of 425,000 immigrants. Id. How-
ever, the House version rejected any cap on immigration. Id. A Roper Poll,
conducted in June of 1980, found that 80% of all Americans are in favor of
reducing the number of legal immigrants admitted annually. Id. at 25.
136. Miller, "The Right Thing to Do "A A History of Simpson-Mazzoli, in CLAMOR
AT THE GATES 70-71 (N. Glazer ed. 1985). The bill was in the hands of the con-
ference committee when the 98th Congress adjourned. Id. at 71. The confer-
ence did not officially adjourn, rather, it ran out of time for action when
Congress adjourned. Id.
137. See generally 1 Imm. L. Serv. §§ 1:15-1:40 (1985). In May of 1985, Sen-
ator Alan Simpson introduced to the Senate the Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act of 1985. Id. at § 1:15. The purpose of the bill was to "amend the
Immigration and Nationality Act to effectively control authorized immigration in
the United States." S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 131 CONG. REC. S7038 (daily
ed. May 24, 1985). The bill does not contain proposals for changes in the legal
immigration system which were part of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. Id. at S7039
(for a summary of the bill, see id. at S7040-S7054). In July of 1985, Representa-
tives Rodino and Mazzoli introduced to the House the Immigration Control and
Legalization Amendments Act of 1985. 1 Imm. L. Serv. at § 1:31. The purpose
of the bill is to "address the question of illegal immigration in a fair and reason-
able manner." H.R. 3080, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H6391 (daily
ed. July 25, 1985) (emphasis added).
138. Fuchs, The Search for a Sound Immigration Policy: A Personal View, in
CLAMOR AT THE GATES 24-26 (N. Glazer ed. 1985) (noting advantages of lawful
immigration). Fuchs would favor a recommendation made by Representative
Hamilton Fish of New York in 1981 and supported by the Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy, to increase "numerically restricted immigra-
tion" from 270,000 to 350,00 a year. Id. at 23. In fact, Fuchs would prefer an
even greater increase but feels that political opposition even for the proposed
increase will be too great due to public concern over the number of illegal immi-
grants. Id. at 24.
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address the proper standard for determining the materiality of misrepre-
sentations on visa applications.' 39 Consequently, the fate of a person
who entered this country by misrepresenting a material fact depends
more on which court hears the case than on the degree of misrepresen-
tation involved.' 40 As a result of the non-uniformity, courts remain di-
vided as to whether to place greater emphasis on the "solemnity" of
attaining United States citizenship or on the "grave consequences" of
denaturalizing and ultimately deporting those who misrepresent their
backgrounds.'41 Ultimately, this issue must be resolved in favor of the
former view.
This conclusion is inescapable in light of the current policy con-
cerning immigration. Americans favor a strict immigration policy. Con-
gress is currently considering proposals that will further limit those who
may legally enter the United States and at the same time make it more
difficult to enter illegally. Thus, United States citizenship obtained
through naturalization might in the future become even more precious.
This right, out of fairness, should be reserved for those aliens who have
entered the United States by complying with all statutory requirements.
Accordingly, it is submitted that the Court should adopt a broad
reading of the Chaunt test and thus insure that only those who have com-
plied with the United States Immigration and Naturalization Laws are
allowed to remain in the country and retain the "priceless treasure" of
United States citizenship.
Esther L. Bachrach
139. See Maikovskis, 106 S. Ct. 2915 (1986); Kowalchuk, 105 S. Ct. 1188
(1986).
140. See Note, Denaturalization and Materiality, supra note 61, at 265.
141. The consequences of deportation can indeed be grave. Feodor
Fedorenko was ordered denaturalized after the Fifth Circuit upheld the district
court's finding that he had made a misrepresentation on his application for visa.
597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). For a discussion of the
facts of Fedorenko, see supra note 57. In 1983, an immigration judge ordered that
he be deported to the Soviet Union. 598 F. Supp. 1525, 1526 (1984). In De-
cember of 1984, he was arrested and deported to the Soviet Union. Id. at 1526.
OneJune 19, 1986, Fedorenko was sentenced to death after being found guilty
of committing war crimes during the Second World War. N.Y. Times, June 20,
1986, at A2, col. 3.
John Demjanjuk was stripped of his American citizenship in 198 1. In March
of 1986, after more than five years of denaturalization, deportation and extradi-
tion hearings, Demjanjuk was extradited to Israel. N.Y. Times, March 1, 1986,
at A3, col. 2. At the time of this writing, it is expected that Demjanjuk will be
convicted of Nazi war crimes and sentenced to death. Id.
Serge Kowalchuk, who was found guilty of making false statements on his
visa application is facing deportation to the Soviet Union where he would stand
trial as a Nazi war criminal. At the time of this article, the Justice Department
has started deportation proceedings against Kowalchuk. Philadelphia Inquirer,
March 1, 1986, at B5, col. I. For a discussion of the facts of Kowlchuk, see supra
note 72.
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